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1Financial Bilateral Contract Negotiation in
Wholesale Electricity Markets
Using Nash Bargaining Theory
Nanpeng Yu, Student Member, IEEE, Leigh Tesfatsion, Member, IEEE, and Chen-Ching Liu, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Bilateral contracts are important risk-hedging in-
struments constituting a major component in the portfolios held
by many electric power market participants. However, bilateral
contract negotiation is a complicated process as it involves risk
management, strategic bargaining, and multi-market participa-
tion. This study analyzes a financial bilateral contract negotiation
process between a generation company and a load-serving entity
in a wholesale electric power market with congestion managed
by locational marginal pricing. Nash bargaining theory is used
to model a Pareto-efficient settlement point. The model predicts
negotiation outcomes under various conditions and identifies
circumstances in which the two parties might fail to reach an
agreement. Both analysis and simulation are used to gain insight
regarding how these negotiation outcomes systematically vary
in response to changes in the participants’ risk preferences and
price biases.
Index Terms—Wholesale electricity market, financial bilateral
contract, negotiation, locational marginal price, Nash bargaining
theory, risk aversion, conditional value-at-risk.
NOMENCLATURE
Bus i Location of a GenCo and LSE in a financial
bilateral contract negotiation.
PG GenCo’s fixed production rate (MW).
AG GenCo’s risk-aversion factor.
AL LSE’s risk-aversion factor.
T Contract period (hours).
λΣ Sum of LMPs realized at bus i during T .
EP Expectation calculated using true probability
measure P (λΣ).
KG Bias affecting probability measure QG(λΣ).
KL Bias affecting probability measure QL(λΣ).
EG Expectation calculated by GenCo using biased
probability measure QG.
EL Expectation calculated by LSE using biased
probability measure QL.
α Confidence level for GenCo and LSE.
CV aRPα Conditional Value-at-Risk calculated using true
probability measure P .
Last revised: 17 April 2011. N.-P. Yu (corresponding author:
eric.ynp@gmail.com) is a market analyst with Southern California Edison,
555 West 5th Street, Los Angeles, CA 90013-1011 USA.
L. Tesfatsion (tesfatsi@iastate.edu) is Professor of Economics, Mathemat-
ics, and Electrical and Computer Engineering, Iowa State University, Ames,
IA, 50011-1070 USA.
C.-C. Liu (liu@ucd.ie) is Professor and Deputy Principal of the College of
Engineering, Mathematical and Physical Sciences, University College Dublin,
Ireland.
This study has been supported in part by a grant from the ISU Electric
Power Research Center.
CV aRGα Conditional Value-at-Risk calculated by GenCo
using biased probability measure QG.
CV aRLα Conditional Value-at-Risk calculated by LSE
using biased probability measure QL.
M Hourly contract amount (MW).
MR Lower bound for negotiated contract amount.
MU Upper bound for negotiated contract amount.
S Hourly contract strike price ($/MWh).
SR Lower bound for negotiated strike price.
SU Upper bound for negotiated strike price.
uG GenCo’s return-risk utility function.
uL LSE’s return-risk utility function.
πG GenCo net earnings.
πL LSE net earnings.
π0G GenCo net earnings if no contract is signed.
π0L LSE net earnings if no contract is signed.
I. INTRODUCTION
COSTLY lessons learned from the California energy crisisin 2000-01 were that overreliance on spot markets can
lead to extremely volatile prices as well as a market design
vulnerable to gaming. The bilateral contracts for longer-
term trades that were disallowed by the California regulators
could have reduced spot price volatility, discouraged gaming
behaviors by power traders, and provided a much-needed
risk-hedging instrument for the three largest investor-owned
utilities.
Bilateral contracting is the most common form of trade
arrangement in many electricity markets. Examples include the
continental European electricity market, the Texas (ERCOT)
wholesale power market, the Nordic electricity market, and the
Japanese electric power exchange [1]. Traders in these markets
routinely hedge their price risks by signing bilateral contracts.
An example of such a contract is a Contract-For-Difference
(CFD) that specifies a strike price ($/MWh) at which a
particular MW amount is to be exchanged at a particular
reference location during a particular contract period. If the
actual price at the reference location differs from the strike
price, the advantaged party is required to “make whole” the
disadvantaged party by paying the difference [2, Section V.A].
Given the prominent role played by negotiated bilateral
contracts in power markets, a crucial question is how the
parties to such contracts successfully negotiate the terms of
their contracts. The negotiation process can be extremely com-
plicated, involving considerations of both risk management
and strategic gaming.
2In particular, a participant in a bilateral contract negotiation
will typically be concerned not only with expected net earnings
but also with risk, i.e., the possibility of adverse deviations
from expected net earnings. Consequently, the participant
will presumably try to negotiate a contract that achieves a
satisfactory trade-off between expected net earnings and risk
in accordance with its risk preferences.
From a game theoretic perspective, each party to a nego-
tiation must always keep in mind that a strategy of trying
to unilaterally improve its own return at the expense of the
other party will typically be self-defeating [3]. Although a
party could insist on pushing the point of agreement in its
favor, this effort will be in vain if the other party then decides
to walk away. A typical bilateral contract negotiation process
involves elements of both cooperation and competition [4].
Moreover, these considerations of risk and strategic gaming
can arise across several distinct markets at the same time.
Within the field of power economics, only a few researchers
to date have studied the bilateral contract negotiation process.
Khatib and Galiana [5] propose a practical process in which
the bargainers take both benefits and risks into account. They
claim that their proposed process will lead to agreement
on a mutually beneficial and risk-tolerable forward bilateral
contract. Song et al. [6] and Son et al. [7] analyze bidding
strategies in a bilateral market in which GenCos submit bids
to loads. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of a Nash equilibrium in bidding strategies are then derived. In
a series of studies, Kockar et al. [8]–[10] examine important
issues arising for mixed pool/bilateral trading. Although the
number of studies focusing on bilateral contract negotiation
in electric power markets is small, a large number of electric
power researchers have examined the related topics of risk
management and portfolio optimization [2], [11]–[26].
This study analyzes a negotiation process between a gener-
ation company (GenCo) and a load-serving entity (LSE) for a
financial bilateral contract,1 taking into account considerations
of risk management, strategic gaming, and multi-market inter-
actions. Given the small amount of previous research on this
technically challenging problem, a relatively simple form of
power purchase agreement is used to permit the derivation of
analytical and computational findings with clear interpretable
results. Our goal is to provide a basic foundation upon which
future research on financial bilateral negotiation in power
markets can build.
Specifically, to model the financial bilateral negotiation
process between the GenCo and LSE, we introduce a key
tool from cooperative game theory: namely, Nash bargaining
theory. In contrast to non-cooperative game theory (e.g.,
Nash equilibrium), cooperative game theory assumes that
participants in strategic situations are able to bargain directly
with each other to reach binding (enforceable) decisions. As
will be clarified below, Nash bargaining theory is a par-
1In U.S. ISO-managed electric power markets such as the Midwest ISO,
a bilateral transaction that involves the physical transfer of energy through a
transmission provider’s region is referred to as a physical bilateral transaction.
A bilateral transaction that only transfers financial responsibility within and
across a transmission provider’s region is referred to as a financial bilateral
transaction.
ticular cooperative-game modeling of a negotiation process
that constrains negotiated outcomes to satisfy basic fairness
and efficiency criteria thought to be important in real-world
bargaining situations. It also identifies circumstances in which
the parties to the negotiation might fail to reach an agreement.
We use Nash bargaining theory to study how negotiated
outcomes between the GenCo and LSE depend on their relative
aversion to risk and on the degree to which their price
estimates are biased. In reaching these negotiated outcomes,
the GenCo and LSE each take into account their perceived
trade-off between risk and expected return. Risk is measured
using Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR), a risk measure now
widely adopted in financial practice. Making use of both ana-
lytical modeling and computational experiments, we carefully
investigate how the negotiated outcomes for the GenCo and
LSE vary systematically in response to changes in their risk
preferences and price biases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II describes the model of a contract-for-difference ne-
gotiation process between a GenCo and an LSE. Technical
results regarding Nash bargaining outcomes for the GenCo
and LSE under different structural conditions are derived in
Section III. A five-bus wholesale power market test case
is used in Section IV to determine the sensitivity of Nash
bargaining outcomes. Concluding remarks and a discussion of
future extensions are provided in Section V.
II. ANALYTICAL FORMULATION OF A FINANCIAL
BILATERAL CONTRACT NEGOTIATION PROBLEM
A. Overview
This section develops an analytical model of a GenCo
G and an LSE L attempting to negotiate the terms of a
financial bilateral contract in order to hedge price risk in a day-
ahead energy market with congestion managed by locational
marginal prices (LMPs). Both G and L are located at the same
bus, so the price risk they face arises from their uncertainty
regarding future LMP outcomes at their common bus.
Each participant G and L is assumed to express its prefer-
ences over possible terms for its negotiated contract by means
of a return-risk utility function. Each participant is assumed
to know the utility function of the other participant. Thus, ex-
pressed in standard game theory terminology, the negotiation
process between G and L is a two-player cooperative game
with a commonly known payoff matrix.
The day-ahead energy market in which G and L participate
entails core features of actual restructured day-ahead energy
markets in the U.S. Specifically, during each operating day
D a market operator runs DC optimal power flow (DC-OPF)
software to determine hourly dispatch schedules and LMPs for
the day-ahead energy market on day D+1. It is assumed that
each GenCo reports its true cost and capacity conditions to the
ISO. The DC-OPF is implemented as in Yu et al. [27] except
that, for simplicity, ancillary services aspects are omitted.
B. The GenCo’s Perspective
To be concrete, GenCo G is assumed to own a single power
plant located at bus i. The production of the power plant is set
3at a fixed rate PG (MW) for which its outage risk is assumed
to be zero. Since the plant’s production rate is fixed, G is not
permitted to bid strategically in the day-ahead energy market.
For simplicity, it is assumed that G has a long-term supply
contract for fuel, implying its fuel costs per MW of production
are essentially fixed. The total variable production cost ($/h)
for G’s power plant in any hour h is given by
TV C(PG) = aPG + bP 2G (1)
Under the above assumptions, the only risk facing G is price
risk induced by the variability of LMP outcomes at its own
bus i. In an attempt to reduce its price risk, suppose G enters
into a financial bilateral contract negotiation with an LSE L,
also located at bus i.
More precisely, suppose G and L attempt to negotiate the
hourly contract amount M (MW) and strike price S ($/MWh)
for a contract-for-difference over a specified period from hour
1 to hour T. Let LMPhi denote the LMP realized at bus
i for any hour h during the period. Under the terms of
this CFD, if LMPhi differs from the strike price S, then the
advantaged party must compensate the disadvantaged party.
For example, if S exceeds LMPhi , the advantaged buyer L must
pay the disadvantaged seller G an amount [S - LMPhi ]·M; and
conversely.
After signing a CFD with hourly contract amount M and
strike price S, the combined net earnings of G from its day-
ahead energy market sales and its CFD, conditional on any
given realization of LMPhi values over the contract period from
hour 1 to hour T, are given by
πG(M,S) =
T∑
h=1
[LMP hi · PG − TV C(PG)]
+
T∑
h=1
[(S − LMP hi ) ·M ] (2)
Let the net earnings attained by G from its day-ahead energy
market sales be denoted by
π0G(λΣ) ≡
T∑
h=1
[LMP hi · PG − TV C(PG)]
= λΣ · PG −
T∑
h=1
TV C(PG) , (3)
where
λΣ ≡
T∑
h=1
LMP hi . (4)
Then G’s net earnings function (2) can be expressed as
πG(M,S) = π0G(λΣ) + [T · S − λΣ] ·M (5)
Note that the time-value of money is not considered in G’s
net earnings function (2). The introduction of a discount rate
could easily be incorporated to obtain a standard present-value
representation for intertemporal net earnings without changing
the analysis below. However, for expositional simplicity it is
assumed that the contract period T for the CFD under study
here is of such short duration that the discount rate across all
hours of T can be set to zero.
GenCo G is a profit-seeking company that negotiates con-
tract terms in an attempt to attain a favorable tradeoff be-
tween expected net earnings and financial risk exposure. To
accomplish this, it makes use of a return-risk utility function to
measure its relative preferences over return-risk combinations.
The best-known example of a return-risk utility function
is the mean-variance utility function traditionally used in
finance to evaluate portfolios of financial assets (e.g., stock
holdings). Often mean-variance utility functions are specified
in a simple parameterized linear form: u(mean,variance) =
mean - A·variance.
Modern finance has moved away from the use of variance
as a measure of financial risk for two key reasons. First, the
return rates for many financial instruments appear to have
thick-tailed probability density functions (PDFs) for which
second moments (hence variances) do not exist.2 Second, in
financial contexts, upside deviations from expected returns
are desirable; only downside deviations satisfy the intuitive
idea that “riskiness” should refer to the possibility of “adverse
consequences.”
Consequently, in place of variance, modern financial re-
searchers now frequently measure the financial risk of an asset
portfolio in terms of single-tail measures such as value-at-
risk (VaR) and conditional-value-at-risk (CVaR). Basically, for
any given confidence level α, the VaR of a portfolio is given
by the smallest number l such that the probability that the
loss in portfolio value exceeds l is no greater than (1-α). In
contrast, the CVaR of a portfolio is defined as the expected
loss in portfolio value during a specified period, conditional
on the event that the loss is greater than or equal to VaR.
Thus, CVaR informs a portfolio holder about expected loss
conditional on the occurrence of an unfavorable event rather
than simply indicating the probability of an unfavorable event.3
In this study the return-risk utility function of GenCo G is
assumed to have the following parameterized linear form:
uG(EG(πG),CV aRGα (−πG))
= EG(πG)−AG · CV aRGα (−πG) (6)
In (6), EG(πG) denotes G’s expected net earnings, and
CV aRGα (−πG) denotes the CVaR associated with G’s “loss
function,” i.e., the negative of G’s net earnings function (2),
conditional on any given confidence level α. The parameter
AG in (6) is G’s risk-aversion factor that determines G’s
2A PDF f(x) for a random variable X is said to be thick tailed if f(x)
and/or f(−x) approaches zero relatively slowly (e.g., relative to a normal
PDF) as |x| approaches infinity. If the convergence is sufficiently slow, the
usual integral characterization for a second moment will not be well defined
for this PDF. In practical terms, this means that the sample variance formed
for such a PDF on the basis of N samples will diverge to infinity almost
surely as N becomes arbitrarily large.
3See [2], [27], [28], and [29] for a more detailed discussion of the meaning
of VaR and CVaR and of the conceptual and technical advantages of CVaR
relative to VaR. This study adopts the original Rockafeller and Uryasev [28]
convention of defining CVaR as the right tail of a loss distribution so that
CVaR is a direct measure of risk, i.e., CVaR increases as risk increases. Some
risk-management researchers prefer to define CVaR as the left tail of a net
earnings distribution.
4preferred tradeoff between expected net earnings and risk
exposure as measured by CVaR.
C. The LSE’s Perspective
On each day D the LSE L submits a demand bid to purchase
power at bus i from the day-ahead energy market for day
D+1 in order to service retail customer load at bus i on day
D+1. This demand bid consists of a 24-h load profile. Retail
customers at bus i pay L a regulated rate f ($/MWh) for
electricity.
At the end of day D the LSE is charged the price LMPhi
($/MWh) for its cleared demand for hour h of day D+1,
where LMPhi is the LMP determined by the market operator
for bus i in hour h via DC-OPF. Any deviation between L’s
cleared demands and its actual demands for day D+1 are
resolved in the real-time market for day D+1 using real-time
market LMPs. However, for simplicity, it is assumed that this
deviation is zero.
The risk faced by L on each day D arises from its uncer-
tainty regarding the prices it will be charged for its cleared
demand. As detailed in Section II-B, it is assumed that L
attempts to partially hedge its price risk at bus i by entering
into a negotiation with GenCo G at bus i for a CFD contract
over a given contract period from hour 1 to hour T. The
negotiable terms of this CFD consist of an hourly contract
amount M (MW) and an hourly strike price S ($/MWh).
Suppose L and G have signed a CFD for a contract amount
M at a strike price S. Let P hLi denote L’s cleared day-ahead
market demand at bus i for any hour h during the contract
period. Then the combined net earnings of L from its day-
ahead energy market purchases and its CFD, conditional on
any given realization of LMPhi values over the CFD contract
period from hour 1 to hour T, are given by
πL(M,S) =
T∑
h=1
[P hLi · (f − LMP hi )]
+
T∑
h=1
[(LMP hi − S) ·M ] (7)
As was done for G, let the net earnings of L from its day-
ahead energy market purchases be denoted by
π0L ≡
T∑
h=1
[P hLi · (f − LMP hi )] (8)
Then, using (4), the net earnings function (7) for L can be
expressed as
πL(M,S) = π0L + [λΣ − T · S] ·M (9)
Finally, similar to G, it is assumed that L uses a return-risk
utility function to represent its preferences over combinations
of expected net earnings and risk. In particular, it is assumed
L’s utility function takes the following parameterized linear
form:
uL(EL(πL),CV aRLα(−πL))
= EL(πL)−AL · CV aRLα(−πL) (10)
In (10), EL(πL) denotes L’s expected net earnings, and
CV aRLα(−πL) denotes the CVaR associated with L’s “loss
function,” i.e., the negative of its net earnings function (7),
conditional on any given confidence level α. The parameter
AL in (10) is L’s risk-aversion factor that determines L’s
preferred tradeoff between expected net earnings and risk
exposure as measured by CVaR.
D. Effects of GenCo and LSE Price Estimation Biases on
Expected Price and Perceived Risk
This section examines how biases in the PDFs used by
GenCo G and LSE L to represent their uncertainty about the
LMP outcomes at their bus i affect their price expectations
and perceived risk exposure. These results will be used in
Section IV to determine how these biases affect the outcomes
of financial bilateral contract negotiation between G and L.
As seen in (5) and (9), the derivatives of the net earnings
functions πG and πL with respect to the contract amount M
depend on prices only through the LMP summation term λΣ
defined in (4). Consequently, price biases distort the contract
amount M negotiated by G and L only to the extent that these
price biases affect the PDFs used by G and L for λΣ.
Suppose the true uncertainty in λΣ over the contract period
can be represented by a probability measure P defined over
a sigma-field F of measurable subsets of a sample space Ω
of elementary events, i.e., by the probability space (Ω,F , P ).
Suppose, instead, that G and L perceive this uncertainty to be
described by probability spaces (Ω,F , QG) and (Ω,F , QL),
respectively, where QG and QL differ from P by constant
shift factors KG and KL as follows:
QG(λΣ + KG) = P (λΣ) (11)
QL(λΣ + KL) = P (λΣ) (12)
The constant shift factors KG and KL will cause the first
moments (means) of QG and QL to deviate from the first
moment (mean) of P , assuming these first moments exist.
However, any higher moments of P will be unchanged by
these constant shift factors.
Let the corresponding PDFs for λΣ under the three different
probability measures P , QG, and QL be denoted by fP (λΣ),
fQG(λΣ), and fQL(λΣ). These probability measures and cor-
responding PDFs satisfy the following relationships:
dP (λΣ) = fP (λΣ)dλΣ (13)
dQG(λΣ) = fQG(λΣ)dλΣ (14)
dQL(λΣ) = fQL(λΣ)dλΣ (15)
It follows from these relationships that
fQG(λΣ + KG) = fP (λΣ) (16)
fQL(λΣ + KL) = fP (λΣ) (17)
Fig. 1 illustrates relationships (16) and (17) for a particular
configuration of biases.
Using the above relationships, the effects of the constant
shift factors KG and KL on the expectation and CVaR for
λΣ can be derived. These derivations are summarized in the
following key theorem, proved in Appendix A.
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fQG
fQL
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KG
Fig. 1. Relationships among true and biased probability density functions
for λΣ given KG > KL > 0
Theorem 1: Given any confidence level α ∈ (0, 1), the expec-
tation and CVaRα measure for λΣ under the true probability
measure P and the biased probability measures QG and QL
satisfy the following relationships:
EG(λΣ) = EP (λΣ) + KG (18)
CV aRGα (λΣ) = CV aR
P
α (λΣ) + KG (19)
EL(λΣ) = EP (λΣ) + KL (20)
CV aRLα(λΣ) = CV aR
P
α (λΣ) + KL (21)
III. A NASH BARGAINING THEORY APPROACH
Section III-A reviews Nash bargaining theory in general
terms. The theory is then applied in Section III-B to the
financial bilateral contract negotiation set out in Section II.
A. Nash Bargaining Theory: General Formulation
Consider two utility-seeking players attempting to agree on
a settlement point u = (u1, u2) in a compact convex utility
possibility set U ⊆ 2. If the two players fail to reach an
agreement, the default outcome is a threat point ζ = (ζ1, ζ2)
satisfying ζ ∈ U and
U ∩ {x ∈ 2 : xj > ζj for j = 1 or j = 2} = ∅ (22)
Let the set of all bargaining problems (U, ζ) satisfying the
above assumptions be denoted by D. For each (U, ζ) ∈ D,
define the barter set as follows:
B(U, ζ) ≡ U ∩ {x ∈ 2 : x ≥ ζ} (23)
Nash [30] defined a bargaining solution to be any function
f :D → 2 that assigns a unique outcome f(U, ζ) ∈ B(U, ζ)
for every bargaining problem (U, ζ) ∈ D. Nash characterized
four axioms considered to be essential for any fair and efficient
bargaining process: invariance under positive linear affine
transformations; symmetry; independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives; and Pareto efficiency; see [31] for details. He then proved
that there is a unique bargaining solution that satisfies these
four axioms. Specifically, for any given bargaining problem
(U, ζ) ∈ D satisfying these four axioms, Nash’s bargaining
solution f∗(U, ζ) ≡ (u∗1, u∗2) ∈ B(U, ζ) is the unique solution
to the following problem: maximize (u1 − ζ1)(u2 − ζ2)
with respect to the choice of (u1, u2) ∈ B(U, ζ). Hereafter
the function f∗ will be referred to as the Nash Bargaining
Solution.
B. Application of Nash Bargaining Theory to the Contract
Negotiation Problem for GenCo G and LSE L
Consider once again the financial bilateral contract problem
set out in Section II. GenCo G and LSE L are engaged in
a negotiation for a contract-for-difference at their common
location, bus i.
Suppose G and L use Nash bargaining theory in an attempt
to negotiate the contract amount M and strike price S for this
CFD. Assume the threat point ζ is given by the utility levels
expected to be attained by G and L if no contract is signed:
ζ1 ≡ uG(EG(π0G), CV aRGα (−π0G)) (24)
ζ2 ≡ uL(EL(π0L), CV aRLα(−π0L)) (25)
Suppose, also, that the feasible negotiation ranges for M and
S are nonempty closed intervals: MR ≤ M ≤ MU , and SR ≤
S ≤ SU .4
The utility possibility set U for G and L’s CFD bargaining
problem is then given by the set of all possible utility outcomes
(6) and (10) for G and L as M and S vary over their
feasible negotiation ranges. The barter set for this bargaining
problem (U, ζ) takes the form B ≡ {(uG, uL) ∈ U :
uG ≥ ζ1, uL ≥ ζ2}. Finally, the Nash bargaining solution
for this CFD bargaining problem is calculated as follows:
max
(uG,uL)∈B
(uG − ζ1)(uL − ζ2) (26)
The following key theorem, proved in Appendix B, estab-
lishes that the barter set B for this CFD bargaining problem
is always convex even though the utility possibility set U can
fail to be convex.
Theorem 2: Suppose the previously given restrictions on the
CFD bargaining problem for G and L all hold. Suppose, also,
that the lowest possible strike price SR is less than SR
∗
as
defined in (27), the highest possible strike price SU is greater
than SU
∗
as defined in (28), and 0 ≤ MR < PG. Then the
Nash barter set B for the CFD bargaining problem for G and
L is a non-empty, compact, convex subset of 2. Specifically,
the barter set B is a compact right triangle when conditions
(29) and (30) both hold (cf. Fig. 2); the barter set B reduces
to the no-contract threat point when inequality (30) does not
hold (cf. Fig. 3); and the barter set B is a compact right
triangle when (29) does not hold but (30) holds (cf. Fig. 4).
4The reason why we include consideration of contract amounts M greater
than the GenCo’s fixed generation level PG is that the LSE might have a
much larger amount of load to serve than PG. In this case, if the LSE is
extremely risk averse, it might be willing to pay a significant “risk premium”
to the GenCo to sign a CFD contract in an amount greater than PG in order
to hedge its risk. The GenCo might be willing to sign the CFD because its
expected net earnings outweigh the price risk associated with its short sale.
6SR
∗
= min{E
P (λΣ) + AGCV aR
P
α (λΣ) + (1 + AG)KG
T [1 + AG]
,
EP (λΣ)− AGCV aRPα (−λΣ) + (1 + AG)KG
T [1 + AG]
,
EP (λΣ) + (1 + AL)KL − ALCV aRPα (−λΣ)
T [1 + AL]
}
(27)
SU
∗
= max{E
P (λΣ) + AGCV aR
P
α (λΣ) + (1 + AG)KG
T [1 + AG]
,
EP (λΣ)− AGCV aRPα (−λΣ) + (1 + AG)KG
T [1 + AG]
,
EP (λΣ) + (1 +AL)KL +ALCV aR
P
α (λΣ)
T [1 + AL]
} (28)
dCV aRLα(−πL(MU , SR))
dM
>
AG −AL
AL[1 + AG]
EP (λΣ)
− AG[1 + AL]
AL[1 + AG]
CV aRPα (λΣ) +
1
AL
KL − 1 + AL
AL
KG + TS
(29)
dCV aRLα(−πL(MR, SR))
dM
<
AG −AL
AL[1 +AG]
EP (λΣ)
+
AG[1 + AL]
AL[1 +AG]
CV aRPα (−λΣ) + 1AL KL −
1 + AL
AL
KG + TS
(30)
UG
UL
(ς1,ς2)
Fig. 2. Illustration of the utility possibility set U and barter set B for GenCo
G and LSE L when (29) and (30) both hold. The barter set is a right triangle.
UG
UL
(ς1,ς2)
Fig. 3. Illustration of the utility possibility set U and barter set B for
GenCo G and LSE L when (30) fails to hold. The barter set reduces to the
non-contract threat point.
UG
UL
(ς1,ς2)
Fig. 4. Illustration of the utility possibility set U and barter set B for GenCo
G and LSE L when (29) does not hold but (30) holds. The barter set is a
right triangle.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Five-Bus Test Case and Experimental Design
This section reports on computational CFD bargaining ex-
periments conducted using a modified version of the bench-
mark five-bus test case presented in [32]. As depicted in Fig
5, the key changes are the addition of GenCo G6 at Bus 3
that owns and operates a power plant at Bus 3, and a more
detailed modeling of LSE 2 at Bus 3.
Fig. 5. Five-bus test case used for computational experiments.
More precisely, G6 is assumed to have the characteristics
of the profit-seeking risk-averse GenCo G described in Sec-
tion II-B, and LSE 2 is assumed to have the characteristics of
the profit-seeking risk-averse LSE L described in Section II-C.
To hedge their price risk at Bus 3, G6 and LSE 2 enter into a
negotiation process for a CFD. As in Section III-B, this CFD
negotiation process is modeled as a Nash bargaining problem,
and outcomes are obtained via a Nash bargaining solution as
in (26).
The two types of experiments reported below examine how
the outcomes of this CFD bargaining problem are affected
by systematic variations in structural conditions. The first
set of experiments investigates the effects of absolute and
relative changes in the risk-aversion factors AG and AL for
G6 and LSE 2, assuming zero price bias. The second set of
experiments investigates the effects of absolute and relative
changes in the price bias factors KG and KL affecting the
estimates formed by G6 and LSE 2 for λΣ, the sum of
7LMPs at Bus 3 during the CFD contract period, conditional
on particular risk aversion settings. For simplicity, these price
bias factors are assumed to be proportional to E[λΣ].
As in Section II-B, G6’s power plant is assumed to have
a quadratic total variable cost (TVC) function given by (1).
The parameters characterizing this TVC function are set as
follows: b = 0.005 and a = 10.0. G6’s fixed production rate
PG is set at 300 MW. The regulated retail resale rate f for
LSE 2 is set at $25/MWh. Also, the confidence level α for
all CVaR evaluations for both GenCo G6 and LSE 2 is set
at 0.95. All line capacities, reactances, and cost and capacity
data for GenCos G1 through G5 are set as in the benchmark
five-bus test case from [32].
The CFD contract period for G6 and LSE 2 is assumed to be
one month, “June.” The “true” daily average load during this
month was generated via a truncated multivariate normal dis-
tribution. To make the case study more realistic, the parameters
for the mean vector and covariance matrix for this distribution
were estimated from MISO load data for June 2006 [33]. The
daily average load and load autocorrelation function used for
sample generation are provided in Tables I and II. The variance
of the daily average load was set at 834.5748 MW 2. The
hourly load was approximated by multiplying the daily total
load by an hourly load weight factor equal to the load weight
factor for the historical data.
TABLE I
DAILY AVERAGE LOAD FOR THE FIVE-BUS TEST CASE DURING THE
CONTRACT MONTH (“JUNE”).
June 1 June 2 June 3 June 4 June 5
337.01 MW 319.10 MW 285.94 MW 268.12 MW 318.61 MW
June 6 June 7 June 8 June 9 June 10
329.53 MW 335.84 MW 336.94 MW 316.81 MW 270.06 MW
June 11 June 12 June 13 June 14 June 15
250.76 MW 297.36 MW 310.81 MW 322.45 MW 338.52 MW
June 16 June 17 June 18 June 19 June 20
360.43 MW 341.99 MW 312.55 MW 351.49 MW 349.64 MW
June 21 June 22 June 23 June 24 June 25
363.59 MW 367.08 MW 336.56 MW 300.43 MW 285.71 MW
June 26 June 27 June 28 June 29 June 30
329.89 MW 335.36 MW 336.34 MW 337.69 MW 336.93 MW
TABLE II
AUTOCORRELATION FUNCTION FOR DAILY AVERAGE LOAD FOR THE
FIVE-BUS TEST CASE DURING THE CONTRACT MONTH (“JUNE”).
Lag 0 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
1.00000 0.68366 0.22233 -0.09257 -0.16865 -0.04008
Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 Lag 11
0.18943 0.36306 0.28063 0.12285 0.00094 -0.05240
Lag 12 Lag 13 Lag 14 Lag 15 Lag 16 Lag 17
-0.05279 -0.03001 -0.00707 0.00596 0.00903 0.00644
Lag 18 Lag 19 Lag 20 Lag 21 Lag 22 Lag 23
0.00251 -0.00028 -0.00137 -0.00125 -0.00065 -0.00011
Lag 24 Lag 25 Lag 26 Lag 27 Lag 28 Lag 29
0.00017 0.00022 0.00015 0.00005 -0.00001 -0.00004
Using the above modeling for hourly loads, 1000 sample
paths were generated for hourly DC-OPF dispatch and LMP
solutions for the day-ahead energy market over the contract
month.To reduce the sample space and corresponding sample
generation time and number of runs necessary for Monte Carlo
simulation, recourse was made to Latin Hypercube Sampling,
an efficient stratified sampling technique [34].
Given each experimental treatment, i.e., each setting for
(AG, AL,KG,KL), these 1000 sample paths were used to
formulate the return-risk utility functions (6) and (10) for G6
and LSE 2 as functions of the contract amount M and strike
price S. The feasible negotiation ranges for M and S were set
as follows:5 M ∈ [0, 600], and S ∈ [15, 25]. The unique Nash
bargaining outcomes for M and S were then determined.
B. Findings
1) Risk-Aversion Treatment: This section examines the
effects of changes in the risk-aversion factors AG and AL
assuming zero price bias (KG = KL = 0).
Table III reports the Nash bargaining outcomes for the
contract amount M and strike price S as AG and AL are
systematically varied from 0.5 to 2.0. Moving from top to
bottom in each column of Table III, the negotiated strike price
S systematically decreases as G6’s risk-aversion factor AG
is increased, holding fixed the risk-aversion factor AL for
LSE 2. Conversely, moving from left to right in each row,
the negotiated strike price S systematically increases as LSE
2’s risk-aversion factor AL is increased, holding fixed the risk-
aversion factor AG for G6. In summary, all else equal, as each
trader becomes more risk averse the negotiated strike price S
moves in a direction that favors the other trader.
TABLE III
EFFECTS OF RISK-AVERSION FACTORS ON THE CONTRACT AMOUNT M
AND STRIKE PRICE S DETERMINED THROUGH NASH BARGAINING.
AG
AL 0.5 1 2
0.5 $19.84/MWh $19.93/MWh $20.02/MWh
300.0 MW 284.4 MW 271.0 MW
1 $19.74/MWh $19.81/MWh $19.88/MWh
300.0 MW 300.0 MW 291.8 MW
2 $19.64/MWh $19.71/MWh $19.77/MWh300.0 MW 300.0 MW 300.0 MW
For S sufficiently close to SU = 25 (the setting for SU
used in all simulation runs), it follows from Lemma 4 that
the net earnings of LSE 2 decrease with increases in the
contract amount M whereas the net earnings of G6 increase
with increases in M . This implies that LSE 2 will prefer a
smaller M and G6 a larger M as S increases, all else equal.
However, it is then unclear which way the actual negotiated
contract amount M will move as the negotiated strike price S
increases.
The findings in Table III reveal that, for each given risk
aversion level AG for G6, a higher risk aversion level AL for
LSE 2 results not only in a higher S but also in an M that
5As required by Theorem 2, it can be shown that the setting SR = 15 is
smaller than SR
∗
in (27) and the setting SU = 25 is greater than SU
∗
in
(28) for each tested configuration for (AG, AL,KG,KL).
8is either unchanged or lower. Conversely, for each given risk
aversion level AL for LSE 2, a lower risk aversion level AG
for G6 results not only in a higher S but also in an M that is
either unchanged or lower. In short, S and M tend to move
inversely in Table III .
Another interesting regularity is observed in the diagonal
elements of Table III. When LSE 2 and G6 have the same level
of risk aversion, a lock-step change in risk aversion for both
LSE 2 and G6 results in no change in the negotiated value for
M . On the other hand, from the off-diagonal elements (0.5,1)
and (1,2) of Table III it is seen that the negotiated outcomes
for M and S can depend on the absolute levels of risk aversion
for LSE 2 and G6; it is not only the relative levels that matter.
Finally, the reason why several combinations of AG and AL
in Table III result in the same contract amount 300 MW is that
GenCo G6 is fully hedged with a 300 MW contract because
its (fixed) production rate is set at 300 MW. Therefore, when
G6 is at least as risk averse as LSE 2, it is not surprising to
see the contract amount M settle at 300 MW.
Figs. 6 and 7 display the effects of changes in the risk-
aversion factor AL for LSE 2 on the post-contract net earnings
histograms for G6 and LSE 2, respectively, assuming the risk-
aversion factor AG for G6 is fixed at 1.0. As LSE 2 becomes
more risk averse, its net earnings histogram shifts to the left,
an unfavorable shift for LSE 2. On the other hand, the net
earnings histogram for G6 shifts to the right, a favorable shift
for G6. These net earnings findings provide additional support
for the conclusion previously drawn from the more aggregated
findings reported in Table III: namely, an increase in risk
aversion for one party to the CFD bargaining process, all else
equal, results in a worse outcome for this party and a more
favorable outcome for the other party.
Fig. 6. GenCo net earnings histogram given a fixed GenCo risk-aversion
factor AG = 1 and varying values for the LSE risk-aversion factor AL
2) LMP Bias Treatment: Experiments were conducted to
determine the effects of changes in the price bias factors KG
and KL for each risk-aversion treatment (AG, AL) in Table III.
It follows from Theorem 1 in Section II-D that a higher value
for KG (or KL) implies G6 (or LSE 2) expects higher LMP
outcomes. Due to space limitations, only the price bias results
for AG = AL = 1 are reported below.6
Table IV reports Nash bargaining outcomes for the contract
amount M and strike price S as the price bias factors KG
6The price bias results for the other risk-aversion treatments are qualitatively
similar.
Fig. 7. LSE net earnings histogram given a fixed GenCo risk-aversion factor
AG = 1 and varying values for the LSE risk-aversion factor AL
and KL are each systematically varied from −0.01EP (λΣ)
to 0.01EP (λΣ). The no-bias case KL = 0 and KG = 0
provides a useful benchmark of comparison. Relative to this
benchmark, if LSE 2 underestimates λΣ, then the strike price
S decreases; and if LSE overestimates λΣ, then S increases.
Conversely, relative to this benchmark, if G6 underestimates
λΣ, then S decreases; and if G6 overestimates λΣ, then S
increases. Also, moving from the lower-left to the upper-right
cell of Table IV—that is, letting KG increase and KL decrease
together—the contract amount M is seen to either remain the
same or decrease.
TABLE IV
EFFECTS OF BIASES IN LMP ESTIMATES ON THE CONTRACT AMOUNT M
AND STRIKE PRICE S DETERMINED THROUGH NASH BARGAINING.
KL
KG −0.01EP (λΣ) 0 0.01EP (λΣ)
−0.01EP (λΣ) $19.60/MWh $19.73/MWh $19.85/MWh300.0 MW 282.8 MW 263.4 MW
0
$19.71/MWh $19.81/MWh $19.93/MWh
300.0 MW 300.0 MW 284.4 MW
0.01EP (λΣ)
$19.81/MWh $19.91/MWh $20.01/MWh
300.0 MW 300.0 MW 300.0 MW
Moreover, for each given price bias level for one negotiation
participant (either G6 or LSE 2), S increases with increases
in the price bias of the other participant. As noted above,
LSE 2 will prefer a smaller M and G6 a larger M as S
increases, all else equal. However, it is then unclear which
way the negotiated contract amount M would move if the
negotiated strike price S increases due to some change in price
bias. Interestingly, Table IV reveals that M is always either
unchanged or lower when S increases due to an increase in
the price bias of G6 conditional on a given price bias for LSE
2. Conversely, M is always either unchanged or higher when
S increases due to an increase in the price bias of LSE 2
conditional on a given price bias for G6.
Additional simulations were also conducted to search
for combinations of the normalized price-bias factors
KG/E
P (λΣ) and KL/EP (λΣ) such that the negotiated con-
tract amount M was zero, implying a no-contract outcome.
These no-contract regions are depicted in Fig. 8 for three
alternative specifications for the risk-aversion factors. As seen,
for each risk-aversion case the boundary of the no-contract
9region in the (KL/EP (λΣ), KG/EP (λΣ)) plane is a line, and
the no-contract region is the half-plane bounded below by this
no-contract line. An important observation from Fig. 8 is that
the no-contract region shrinks in size as the traders become
more risk averse and hence more anxious to successfully agree
on a contract.
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Fig. 8. No-contract boundaries and regions under three combinations of
risk-aversion factors
V. CONCLUSION
This study analyzes Nash bargaining settlement outcomes
for a contract-for-difference (CFD) negotiation between a
GenCo and an LSE facing price risk from uncertain LMP
outcomes at a common bus location. Using both analysis and
computational experiments, it is shown that differing levels of
risk aversion and biases in LMP estimations have systematic
effects on the negotiated contract amount and strike price,
hence also on the post-contract net earnings distributions for
the GenCo and LSE. In addition, circumstances in which the
two parties can fail to reach an agreement are identified.
Future studies will consider more general contract negoti-
ation problems involving both financial and physical energy
contracts between wholesale power market traders located at
possibly different buses. In this case full hedging of price
risk can require traders to combine CFDs with additional
instruments, such as financial transmission rights, to take into
account LMP separation across buses due to transmission
congestion. Another important topic for future studies is the
extension of the current model to handle multilateral contract
negotiation problems to better capture medium-term contract-
ing opportunities.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1 IN SECTION II-D
The proof of Theorem 1 follows directly from Propositions
1–3, below. For expositional simplicity, the assumptions of
Theorem 1 are not repeated in the statement of each proposi-
tion but are instead tacitly assumed to hold.
Proposition 1: The expected values for λΣ derived under the
three probability measures P , QG, and QL satisfy (18) and
(20).
Proof of Proposition 1: The expected value of λΣ derived
under QG (with pdf fQG ) is given by
EG(λΣ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
λΣfQG(λΣ)dλΣ
=
∫ +∞
−∞
λΣfP (λΣ −KG)dλΣ (31)
Introducing the change of variables λ′Σ = λΣ −KG,
EG(λΣ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
(λ′Σ + KG)fP (λ
′
Σ)dλ
′
Σ
=
∫ +∞
−∞
λ′ΣfP (λ
′
Σ)dλ
′
Σ + KG
∫ +∞
−∞
fP (λ′Σ)dλ
′
Σ
= EP (λΣ) + KG (32)
It can similarly be shown that EL(λΣ) = EP (λΣ)+KL. QED
Proposition 2: The VaR values for λΣ derived under P , QG,
and QL satisfy
V aRGα (λΣ −KG) = V aRPα (λΣ) (33)
V aRLα(λΣ −KL) = V aRPα (λΣ) (34)
Proof of Proposition 2: V aRGα (λΣ) and V aRPα (λΣ) are
defined as follows:
V aRGα (λΣ) ≡ inf{Λ ∈  : QG(λΣ > Λ) ≤ 1− α}
= inf{Λ ∈  :
∫ +∞
Λ
fQG(λΣ)dλΣ ≤ 1− α}
(35)
V aRPα (λΣ) ≡ inf{Λ ∈  : P (λΣ > Λ) ≤ 1− α}
= inf{Λ ∈  :
∫ +∞
Λ
fP (λΣ)dλΣ ≤ 1− α}
(36)
It follows from the definition of V aRGα (λΣ) that
V aRGα (λΣ −KG)
= inf{Λ ∈  : QG(λΣ −KG > Λ) ≤ 1− α}
= inf{Λ ∈  : QG(λΣ > Λ + KG) ≤ 1− α}
= inf{Λ ∈  :
∫ +∞
Λ+KG
fQG(λΣ)dλΣ ≤ 1− α}
= inf{Λ ∈  :
∫ +∞
Λ+KG
fP (λΣ −KG)dλΣ ≤ 1− α}
(37)
Introducing the change of variables λ′Σ = λΣ −KG,
V aRGα (λΣ −KG)
= inf{Λ ∈  :
∫ +∞
Λ
fP (λ′Σ)dλ
′
Σ ≤ 1− α}
= V aRPα (λΣ) (38)
It can similarly be shown that V aRLα(λΣ − KL) =
V aRPα (λΣ). QED
Proposition 3: The CVaR values for λΣ derived under P , QG,
and QL satisfy (19) and (21).
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Proof of Proposition 3: Let Y denote any real-valued
random variable measurable with respect to a probability space
(Ω,F , μ). Let α ∈ (0, 1), and let A denote the measurable
subset of points ω ∈ Ω such that Y (ω) ≥ V aRμα(Y ), which
implies (by definition of VaR) that μ(A) = [1 − α]. Then
CVaRμα(Y) is defined as follows:
CV aRμα(Y ) ≡
1
1− α
∫
A
Y dμ(Y ) (39)
Recall that fQG is the pdf corresponding to the probability
measure QG. It follows that
CV aRGα (λΣ) =
1
1− α
∫ +∞
V aRGα (λΣ)
λΣfQG(λΣ)dλΣ
=
1
1− α
∫ +∞
V aRPα (λΣ+KG)
λΣfP (λΣ −KG)dλΣ
(40)
Introducing the change of variables λ′Σ = λΣ −KG,
CV aRGα (λΣ)
=
1
1− α
∫ +∞
V aRPα (λΣ+KG)−KG
(λ′Σ + KG)fP (λ
′
Σ)dλ
′
Σ
=
1
1− α
∫ +∞
V aRPα (λΣ)
λ′ΣfP (λ
′
Σ)dλ
′
Σ
+
1
1− αKG
∫ +∞
V aRPα (λΣ)
fP (λ′Σ)dλ
′
Σ
=CV aRPα (λΣ) + KG (41)
It can similarly be shown that CV aRLα(λΣ) = CV aRPα (λΣ)+
KL. QED
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2 IN SECTION III-B
This section provides a proof for Theorem 2 making use of
four lemmas. For expositional simplicity, the assumptions of
Theorem 2 are not repeated in the statement of each lemma
but are instead tacitly assumed to hold. Also, throughout this
appendix the α subscripts on all VaR and CVaR expressions
are omitted, as are the P -superscripts for all expectations, VaR,
and CVaR expressions calculated using the true probability
measure P .
Lemma 1: CV aRL(−πL(M,S)) is convex in M for any S ∈
[SR, SU ].
Proof of Lemma 1: Let S ∈ [SR, SU ] be given. To prove
that CV aRL(−πL(M,S)) is convex in M , we need to show
that, for arbitrary M1, M2, and 0 < λ < 1, the following
inequality holds,
CV aRL(−πL(λM1 + [1− λM2], S))
≤ λCV aRL(−πL(M1, S)) + (1− λ)CV aRL(−πL(M2, S))
(42)
Using the convexity of CVaR we have,
right =λCV aRL(−π0L −M1(λΣ − TS))
+ (1− λ)CV aRL(−π0L −M2(λΣ − TS))
≥CV aRL(−λπ0L − λM1(λΣ − TS)
− (1− λ)π0L − (1 − λ)M2(λΣ − TS))
= CV aRL(−π0L − [λM1 + (1 − λ)M2](λΣ − TS))
= left (43)
QED
Lemma 2: Given any contract amount M ∈ [MR,MU ],
varying the strike price S from SR to SU maps under (6) and
(10) into a straight line in U with slope −[1+AL]/[1+AG].
Proof of Lemma 2: Using (5) and (9), we have
πG(M,S + ΔS)− πG(M,S) = TMΔS (44)
πL(M,S + ΔS)− πL(M,S) = −TMΔS (45)
Taking expectations on each side of equations (44) and (45),
EGπG(M,S + ΔS)− EGπG(M,S) = TMΔS (46)
ELπL(M,S + ΔS)− ELπL(M,S) = −TMΔS (47)
It follows immediately from the definition of CVaR that CVaR
is translation-equivariant, i.e. CV aR(Y +c) = CV aR(Y )+c.
Thus
CV aRG(−πG(M,S + ΔS))
= CV aRG(−πG(M,S)− TMΔS)
= CV aRG(−πG(M,S))− TMΔS (48)
Rearranging the terms in the above equation, we have
CV aRG(−πG(M,S + ΔS))−CV aRG(−πG(M,S))
= − TMΔS (49)
Similarly, we have
CV aRL(−πL(M,S + ΔS))−CV aRL(−πL(M,S))
= TMΔS (50)
The utility functions for GenCo G and LSE L are defined
in (6) and (10). Using these definitions, together with relation-
ships (46), (47), (49), and (50), we have
uG(EG(πG(M,S + ΔS)), CV aRG(−πG(M,S + ΔS)))
−uG(EG(πG(M,S)), CV aRG(−πG(M,S)))
= TMΔS[1 + AG]
(51)
and
uL(EL(πL(M,S + ΔS)), CV aRL(−πL(M,S + ΔS)))
−uL(EL(πL(M,S)), CV aRL(−πL(M,S)))
= −TMΔS[1 + AL]
(52)
It follows that
duG
dS
= TM [1 + AG] (53)
duL
dS
= −TM [1 + AL] (54)
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Integrating both sides of equations (53) and (54) with respect
to S, we have
uG + C1 = TM [1 + AG]S + C2 (55)
uL + C3 = −TM [1 + AL]S + C4 (56)
Multiply equations (55) and (56) by [1+AL] and [1+AG], re-
spectively, and add the resulting expressions. After rearranging
terms,
[1 + AL]uG + [1 + AG]uL
= −[1 + AL]C1 + [1 + AL]C2 − [1 + AG]C3 + [1 + AG]C4
(57)
Totally differentiating this expression, it follows that
duL
duG
= − 1 + AL
1 + AG
(58)
QED
To better understand the proof of the next lemma, the reader
might wish to view Figs. 10 through 12 used below for the
main proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 3: If the strike price S is fixed at its lowest possible
level SR, then the locus of points (uG, uL) traced out in the
utility possibility set U under (6) and (10) as the contract
amount M varies from MR to MU determines a concave
curve V1 in U . Conversely, if the strike price S is fixed at its
highest possible level SU , then the locus of points (uG, uL)
traced out in U under (6) and (10) as M varies from MR to
MU determines a concave curve V2 in U .
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose the strike price S is fixed at its
lowest possible level SR. Using (5),
EGπG(M + ΔM,S)−EGπG(M,S)
=ΔM [TS − EG(λΣ)]
=ΔM [TS − E(λΣ)]−ΔMKG
≡−Δδ −ΔMKG (59)
Similarly,
ELπL(M + ΔM,S)−ELπL(M,S)
=ΔM [EL(λΣ)− TS]
=ΔM [E(λΣ)− TS] + ΔMKL
=Δδ + ΔMKL (60)
The rest of the proof for S = SR will be presented under
two conditions that cover all possibilities.
Condition 1: M > P G
CV aRG(−πG(M,S))
= CV aRG(−PGλΣ + COST −M [TS − λΣ])
= CV aRG((M − PG)λΣ + COST − TM S])
= (M − PG)CV aRG(λΣ) + COST − TM S (61)
Therefore, we have
CV aRG(−πG(M + ΔM,S))− CV aRG(−πG(M,S))
= ΔM CV aRG(λΣ)−ΔMTS
= ΔM [CV aR(λΣ)− TS] + ΔMKG ≡ Δε1 + ΔMKG
(62)
Now,
ΔuG ≡
uG(EG(πG(M + ΔM,S)), CV aRG(−πG(M + ΔM,S)))
−uG(EG(πG(M,S)), CV aRG(−πG(M,S)))
= −Δδ −ΔMKG −AG(Δε1 + ΔMKG) (63)
Next calculate the right derivative of uG with respect to M :
duG
dM
|+= lim
ΔM→0+
ΔuG
ΔM
= lim
ΔM→0+
{ΔM [TS − E(λΣ)−KG]
ΔM
+
−AGΔM [CV aR(λΣ) + KG − TS]
ΔM
}
= TS − E(λΣ)−KG −AG CV aR(λΣ)−AGKG + TAGS
(64)
Integrate both sides of the above equation and rearrange the
terms we have,
uG =[TS − E(λΣ)−AGCV aR(λΣ)
+ TAGS − (1 + AG)KG]M + C5
=C6M + C5 (65)
From (65), M can be viewed as a function of uG. We
can thus calculate the derivative of uL with respect to uG
as follows:
duL
duG
=
duL
dM
· dM
duG
= [
dEL(πL(M,S))
dM
−AL dCV aR
L(−πL(M,S))
dM
]
1
C6
(66)
Taking the derivative of each side of (66) with respect to uG,
we have
d2uL
du2G
=
1
C6
[
d2EL(πL(M,S))
dM2
dM
duG
−AL d
2CV aRL(−πL(M,S))
dM2
dM
duG
]
=
1
C26
[
d2EL(πL(M,S))
dM2
−AL d
2CV aRL(−πL(M,S))
dM2
] (67)
Taking the expectation and then the derivative with respect to
M on each side of equation (7), we get
dEL(πL(M,S))
dM
= E(λΣ) + KL − TS (68)
Then obviously we have
d2EL(πL(M,S))
dM
= 0 (69)
Now equation (67) can be reduced to the following:
d2uL
du2G
= −AL 1
C26
d2CV aRL(−πL(M,S))
dM2
(70)
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As shown in Lemma 1, CV aRL(−πL(M,S)) is convex in
M. Consequently,
d2CV aRL(−πL(M,S))
dM2
≥ 0 (71)
It follows that
d2uL
du2G
= −AL 1
C26
d2CV aR(−πL(M,S))
dM2
≤ 0 (72)
Therefore, given Condition 1, the curve of points (uG, uL)
traced out in U space as M varies from PG to MU is concave.
Condition 2: M ≤ P G
CV aRG(−πG(M,S))
= CV aRG(−PGλΣ + COST −M(TS − λΣ))
= CV aRG(−λΣ(PG −M) + COST − TM S])
= (PG −M)CV aRG(−λΣ) + COST − TM S (73)
Therefore, we have
CV aRG(−πG(M + ΔM,S))− CV aRG(−πG(M,S))
= −ΔM CV aRG(−λΣ)−ΔMTS
= −ΔM [CV aR(−λΣ) + TS] + ΔMKG
≡ Δε2 + ΔMKG (74)
Now,
ΔuG ≡
uG(EG(πG(M + ΔM,S)), CV aRG(−πG(M + ΔM,S)))
−uG(EG(πG(M,S)), CV aRG(−πG(M,S)))
= −Δδ −ΔMKG −AG(Δε2 + ΔMKG) (75)
Next calculate the left derivative of uG with respect to M :
duG
dM
|−= lim
ΔM→0−
ΔuG
ΔM
= lim
ΔM→0−
{ΔM [TS − E(λΣ)−KG]
ΔM
+
AGΔM [CV aR(−λΣ −KG) + TS]
ΔM
}
= TS − E(λΣ)+AG CV aR(−λΣ) + TAG S − (1 + AG)KG
(76)
Integrate both sides of the above equation and rearrange the
terms we have,
uG = [TS − E(λΣ) + AG CV aR(−λΣ)
+ TAG S − (1 + AG)KG]M + C7
= C8M + C7 (77)
Similar to the derivation in Condition 1, the second deriva-
tive of uL with respect to uG can be calculated as
d2uL
du2G
= −AL 1
C28
d2CV aRL(−πL(M,S))
dM2
(78)
Given the inequality relationship in (71), we have
d2uL
du2G
= −AL 1
C28
d2CV aRL(−πL(M,S))
dM2
≤ 0 (79)
Therefore, given Condition 2, the curve of points (uG, uL)
traced out in U space as M varies from MR to PG is once
again concave.
In summary, when the strike price S is fixed at the lowest
possible level, SR, it has been shown that the contract amount
interval from MR to PG and the contract amount interval from
PG to MU each map under (6) and (10) into a concave curve
in the utility possibility set U traced out by uL(uG) in U as M
varies from MR to PG and from PG to MU , respectively. It
remains to show that the entire curve V1 traced out by uL(uG)
in U as M varies from MR to MU is concave in U .
It follows easily from previous results above that uL(uG)
is a continuous function of uG at the meeting point M = PG.
Therefore, to prove the concavity of V1 in U , it suffices to
show that the following inequality holds at the meeting point
M = PG:
duL
duG
|− ≥ duL
duG
|+ (80)
As will be established formally in Lemma 4 below, when the
contract strike price S is fixed at SR, the GenCo’s utility level
uG decreases as the contract amount M increases, i.e., uG and
M move in opposite directions. Consequently, the left (right)
derivative of uL with respect uG in (80) can be reexpressed
in terms of right (left) derivatives with respect to M .
Specifically, making use of (66),
duL
duG
|−= duL
dM
|M=P+
G
dM
duG
|M=P+
G
=[
dEL(πL(M,S))
dM
|M=P+
G
−AL dCV aR
L(−πL(M,S))
dM
|M=P+
G
]
1
C6
(81)
Similarly, making use of (77)
duL
duG
|+= duL
dM
|M=P−
G
dM
duG
|M=P−
G
=[
dEL(πL(M,S))
dM
|M=P−
G
−AL dCV aR
L(−πL(M,S))
dM
|M=P−
G
]
1
C8
(82)
Using the definition of C6 and C8 from (65) and (77), we
have
C8 − C6 = AG[CV aR(−λΣ) + CV aR(λΣ)]
= 2AG[
1
2
CV aR(−λΣ) + (1− 12)CV aR(λΣ)]
≥ CV aR(1
2
(−λΣ) + 12λΣ) = 0 (83)
Since, SR < SR
∗ ≤ E(λΣ)−AGCV aR(−λΣ)+(1+AG)KGT (1+AG) ,
we have C8 < 0. Similarly, since SR < SR
∗ ≤
E(λΣ)+AGCV aR(λΣ)+(1+AG)KG
T (1+AG)
, we have C6 < 0. Therefore,
together with (83), we have − 1C8 ≥ − 1C6 > 0.
From (68) we have,
dEL(πL(M,S))
dM
|M=P+
G
=
dEL(πL(M,S))
dM
|M=P−
G
= E(λΣ) + KL − TS (84)
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From the definition of left and right derivative we have,
dCV aRL(−πL(M,S))
dM
|M=P−
G
= lim
ΔM→0−
CV aRL(−πL(PG + ΔM,S))− CV aRL(−πL(PG, S))
ΔM
= lim
ΔM→0+
CV aRL(−πL(PG −ΔM,S))− CV aRL(−πL(PG, S))
−ΔM
= lim
ΔM→0+
CV aRL(−πL(PG))− CV aRL(−πL(PG −ΔM,S, S))
−ΔM
(85)
and,
dCV aRL(−πL(M,S))
dM
|M=P+
G
= lim
ΔM→0+
CV aRL(−πL(PG + ΔM,S))− CV aRL(−πL(PG, S))
ΔM
(86)
Using the convexity of CVaR, we have
2 [
1
2
CV aRL(−πL(PG + ΔM,S))+
1
2
CV aRL(−πL(PG −ΔM,S))]
≥ 2 (CV aRL(−πL(12(PG + ΔM) +
1
2
(PG −ΔM), S)))
=2 CV aRL(−πL(PG, S)) (87)
Moving the terms around in the above inequality, we have
CV aRL(−πL(PG + ΔM,S))− CV aRL(−πL(PG, S))
≥ CV aRL(−πL(PG, S))− CV aRL(−πL(PG −ΔM,S))
(88)
Combining, (88), (85) and (86), we have
dCV aRL(−πL(M,S))
dM
|M=P+
G
≥
dCV aRL(−πL(M,S))
dM
|M=P−
G
(89)
Therefore, from (81) and (82), and that if SR < SR
∗
, as
M increase, uL increases we have
0 <
duL
dM
|M=P+
G
≤ duL
dM
|M=P−
G
(90)
Combining (90) with (81), (82), and the previously derived
condition − 1C8 ≥ − 1C6 > 0, one obtains the desired condition
(80).
The proof of the second statement in Lemma 3 pertaining
to the case in which the strike price S is fixed at its highest
possible level SU is entirely analogous to the proof above for
the first statement in Lemma 3.
QED
Before moving onto Lemma 4, additional derivations are
provided with regard to ΔuL, which will be used in the
following Lemma.
As is well known, CV aR is convex in the following sense:
For arbitrary (possibly dependent) random variables Y1, Y2 and
λ with 0 < λ < 1, CV aR(λY1+(1−λ)Y2) ≤ λCV aR(Y1)+
(1− λ)CV aR(Y2). Hence we have,
CV aRL(−πL(M,S))−Δε2 −ΔMKL
=CV aRL(−π0L −M(λΣ − TS)
+ ΔM(CV aR(−λΣ −KL) + TS))
=CV aRL(−π0L −M(λΣ − TS)
+ CV aRL(−λΣΔM + TSΔM)
=2{ 1
2
CV aRL(−π0L −M(λΣ − TS))
+
1
2
CV aRL(−λΣΔM + TSΔM)}
≥2[CV aRL(1
2
(−π0L −M(λΣ − TS))
+
1
2
(−λΣΔM + TSΔM)
=CV aRL(−π0L − (M + ΔM)(λΣ − TS))
=CV aRL(−πL(M + ΔM,S)) (91)
Rearranging the terms in the above equation, we have
CV aRL(−πL(M + ΔM,S))− CV aRL(−πL(M,S))
+ΔMKL ≡ −Δε′2 + ΔMKL
≤ −Δε2 = ΔM [CV aR(−λΣ) + TS] (92)
Hence, ΔuL can be derived as,
ΔuL ≡
uL(EL(πL(M + ΔM,S)), CV aRL(−πL(M + ΔM,S)))
−uL(EL(πL(M,S)), CV aRL(−πL(M,S)))
= Δδ + ΔMKL + ALΔε′2 (93)
Similar to inequality (91) we have,
CV aRL(−πL(M + ΔM,S)) + Δε1 + ΔMKL
= CV aRL(−πL(M + ΔM,S))
+ [CV aR(λΣ) + KL − TS]ΔM
= 2{ 1
2
CV aRL(−πL(M + ΔM,S))
+
1
2
CV aRL(ΔM(λΣ − TS))}
≥2CV aRL(1
2
(−π0L − (M + ΔM)(λΣ − TS)
+ ΔMλΣ − TSΔM))
= CV aRL(−π0L −M(λΣ − TS))
= CV aRL(−πL(M,S)) (94)
Rearranging the terms in the above equation, we have
CV aRL(−πL(M + ΔM,S))− CV aRL(−πL(M,S))
+ΔMKL ≡ −Δε′1 + ΔMKL
≥ −Δε1 = −ΔM [CV aR(λΣ)− TS] (95)
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Hence, ΔuL can be derived as,
ΔuL ≡
uL(EL(πL(M + ΔM,S)), CV aRL(−πL(M + ΔM,S)))
−uL(EL(πL(M,S)), CV aRL(−πL(M,S)))
= Δδ + ΔMKL + ALΔε′1 (96)
Lemma 4: If SR is less than SR
∗
as defined in (27), then
with the strike price S fixed at SR, as the contract amount
M increases, uG decreases and uL increases. If SU is greater
than SU
∗
as defined in (28), then with the strike price S fixed
at SU , as the contract amount M increases, uG increases and
uL decreases.
Proof of Lemma 4:
Part 1: Proof that if SR is less than SR
∗
as defined in
(27), then with the strike price fixed at SR, as the contract
amount M increases, uG decreases and uL increases.
As shown in equation (93), ΔuL = Δδ+ΔMKL+ALΔε′2.
As given in equation (92), Δε′2 ≥ Δε2 +ΔMKL. Hence, we
have
ΔuL ≥ Δδ + ΔMKL + AL(Δε2 + ΔMKL) (97)
After substituting Δδ and Δε2 into the above equation, we
see that inequality (97) is equivalent to
ΔuL ≥ΔM [E(λΣ)−
TSR + KL −ALCV aR(−λΣ)−ALTSR + ALKL]
(98)
Since, SR is less than E(λΣ)+(1+AL)KL−ALCV aR(−λΣ)T (1+AL) , and
AL > −1, it can be shown that the right hand side of the
above inequality is greater than 0. Therefore, with the strike
price fixed at SR, as the contract amount M increases, uL
increases.
The rest of the proof will be presented under two conditions
that cover all possibilities.
Condition 1: M > P G
As shown in equation (65), uG = C6M + C5. Since SR <
E(λΣ)+AGCV aR(λΣ)+(1+AG)KG
T (1+AG)
, and AG > −1, C6 < 0.
Hence, given Condition 1, with the strike price fixed at SR,
when M increases, uG decreases.
Condition 2: M ≤ P G
As shown in equation (77), uG = C8M + C7. Since SR <
E(λΣ)−AGCV aR(−λΣ)+(1+AG)KG
T (1+AG)
, and AG > −1, C8 < 0.
Hence, given Condition 2, with the strike price fixed at SR,
when M increases, uG decreases.
Part 2: Proof that if SU is greater than SU
∗
as defined
in (28), then with the strike price S fixed at SU , as
the contract amount M increases, uG increases and uL
decreases.
As shown in equation (96), ΔuL = Δδ+ΔMKL+ALΔε′1.
As given in equation (95), Δε′1 ≤ Δε1 +ΔMKL. Hence, we
have
ΔuL ≤ Δδ + ΔMKL + AL(Δε1 + ΔMKL) (99)
After substituting Δδ and Δε1 into the above equation, we
see that inequality (99) is equivalent to
ΔuL ≤ΔM [E(λΣ)−
TSU + KL + ALCV aR(λΣ)−ALTSU + ALKL]
(100)
Since, SU is greater than E(λΣ)+(1+AL)KL+ALCV aR(λΣ)T (1+AL) , and
AL > −1, it can be shown that the right hand side of the
above inequality is smaller than 0. Therefore, with the strike
price fixed at SU , as the contract amount M increases, uL
decreases.
The rest of the proof will be presented under two conditions
that cover all possibilities.
Condition 1: M > P G
As shown in equation (65), uG = C6M + C5. Since SU >
E(λΣ)+AGCV aR(λΣ)+(1+AG)KG
T (1+AG)
, and AG > −1, C6 > 0.
Hence, given Condition 1, with the strike price fixed at SU ,
when M increases, uG increases.
Condition 2: M ≤ P G
As shown in equation (77), uG = C8M +C7. Since SR >
E(λΣ)−AGCV aR(−λΣ)+(1+AG)KG
T (1+AG)
, and AG > −1, C8 > 0.
Hence, given Condition 2, with the strike price fixed at SU ,
when M increases, uG increases.
QED
Lemma 5: Consider the following two conditions:
duL
duG
|MR,SR < − 1 + AL1 + AG (101)
duL
duG
|MU ,SR > − 1 + AL1 + AG (102)
Inequality (101) is equivalent to inequality (30), and inequality
(102) is equivalent to inequality (29).
Proof of Lemma 5:
Part 1: Proof that inequality (101) is equivalent to
inequality (30)
Inequality (101) implies M ≤ PG. Similar to equation
(106), we now have
duL
duG
= [E(λΣ)+KL−TS−AL dCV aR
L(−πL(M,S))
dM
]
1
C8
(103)
After substituting C8 into the above equation, we see that
inequality (101) is equivalent to
− E(λΣ) + KL − TS −AL
dCV aRL(−πL(MR,SR))
dM
E(λΣ)− TS −AGCV aR(−λΣ)− TAGS + (1 + AG)KG
< − 1 + AL
1 + AG
(104)
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Rearranging the terms in the above equation, we have
duL
duG
|MR,SR< − 1 + AL1 + AG ⇔
dCV aRL(−πL(MR, SR))
dM
<
AG −AL
AL(1 + AG)
E(λΣ)
+
AG(1 + AL)
AL(1 + AG)
CV aR(−λΣ) + 1
AL
KL − 1 + AL
AL
KG + TS
(105)
Part 2: Proof that inequality (102) is equivalent to
inequality (29)
Inequality (102) implies M > PG. Substituting equation
(68) into (66), we have
duL
duG
= [E(λΣ)+KL−TS−AL dCV aR
L(−πL(M,S))
dM
]
1
C6
(106)
After substituting C6 into the above equation, we see that
inequality (102) is equivalent to
− E(λΣ) + KL − TS −AL
dCV aRL(−πL(MU ,SR))
dM
E(λΣ)− TS + AGCV aR(λΣ)− TAGS + (1 + AG)KG
> − 1 + AL
1 + AG
(107)
Rearranging the terms in the above equation, we have
duL
duG
|MU ,SR> −
1 + AL
1 + AG
⇔
dCV aRL(−πL(MU , SR))
dM
>
AG −AL
AL(1 + AG)
E(λΣ)
−AG(1 + AL)
AL(1 + AG)
CV aR(λΣ) +
1
AL
KL − 1 + AL
AL
KG + TS
(108)
QED
Theorem 2: Suppose the stated restrictions on the CFD bar-
gaining problem hold for G and L. Suppose, also, that the
lowest strike price SR is less than SR
∗
as defined in (27),
the highest strike price SU is greater than SU
∗
as defined in
(28), and 0 ≤ MR < PG. Then the Nash barter set B for
this problem is a non-empty, compact, convex subset of 2, as
follows:
Case 1. The barter set B is a compact right triangle when
conditions (29) and (30) both hold, cf. Fig. 2.
Case 2. The barter set B reduces to the no-contract threat
point when inequality (30) does not hold, cf. Fig. 3.
Case 3. The barter set B is a compact right triangle when
(29) does not hold but (30) holds, cf. Fig. 4.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Before considering the shape of the utility possibility set U ,
first consider the following two curves. The first curve V1 is
the locus of points (uG, uL) traced out in U as M varies from
MR to MU , given a strike price S = SR. The second curve
V2 is the locus of points (uG, uL) traced out in U as M varies
from MR to MU , given a strike price S = SU .
As seen in Lemma 3, the curves V1 and V2 are concave
in U . Moreover, as proved in Lemma 4, with the strike price
fixed at SR, as M increases, uG decreases and uL increases.
Similarly, if the strike price is fixed at SU , as M increases,
uG increases and uL decreases. Therefore, at each point along
V1 and V2 the slope is negative. Note, as proved in Lemma 2,
given any contract amount M ∈ [MR,MU ], varying the strike
price S from SR to SU maps under (6) and (10) into a straight
line in U with slope −[1 + AL]/[1+ AG]. Hence, connecting
the points on V1 and V2 that have the same contract amount
M , we have straight lines with a slope of −[1+AL]/[1+AG].
In addition, every single point on these straight lines belongs
to U .
The proof of Theorem 2 will be divided into three parts
corresponding to the three possible cases in the statement of
the theorem.
Case 1:
When following the proof below, please refer to Fig. 10.
As shown in Lemma 5, when conditions (101) and (102) both
hold, the slope of V1 at the threat point is smaller than− 1+AL1+AG ;
and, when M = MU , the slope of V1 is greater than − 1+AL1+AG .
Therefore, since V1 is concave, the slope of V1 must steadily
increase from below − 1+AL1+AG to over − 1+AL1+AG as M increases
from 0 to MU , and uG correspondingly decreases.
As indicated in Lemma 3, V2 is also concave. Moreover,
the slope of V2 at the threat point is larger than − 1+AL1+AG . This
statement can be proved by contradiction. Assume that, when
the slope of V1 at the threat point is smaller than − 1+AL1+AG , the
slope of V2 at the threat point is also smaller than − 1+AL1+AG .
This situation is plotted in Fig. 9. Pick a point Z on V1 above
the straight line with a slope of− 1+AL1+AG which passes the threat
point. By construction, Z takes the form Z = (uL |(M ′,SR)
, uG |(M ′,SR)). According to Lemma 2, the point (uL |(M ′,SU )
, uG |(M ′,SU )) on V2 together with Z must be on a straight
line with a slope of − 1+AL1+AG . Therefore, the point (uL |(M ′,SU )
, uG |(M ′,SU )) on V2 must be above the straight line with a
slope of − 1+AL1+AG that passes through the threat point. However,
since the initial slope of V2 is smaller than − 1+AL1+AG , and V2
is concave, no point on V2 is above this straight line. This
contradicts Lemma 2, which completes the proof.
Fig. 9. Supporting graph for proving that the slope of V2 at the threat point
is larger than − 1+AL
1+AG
when the slope of V1 at the threat point is smaller
than − 1+AL
1+AG
.
As proved in Lemma 2, all the points that belong to the
utility possibility set U are on parallel lines with one end on
16
V1 and with a slope of −[1+AL]/[1+AG]. Hence, the typical
utility possibility set U for Case 1 is as shown in Fig. 10.
Fig. 10. Illustration of the Case 1 utility possibility set U and barter set B
for GenCo G and LSE L. The barter set is a right triangle.
Since the slope of V1 gradually increases from below
− 1+AL1+AG to above − 1+AL1+AG , there exists a contract amount
M∗ such that duLduG |−≥ − 1+AL1+AG and duLduG |+≤ − 1+AL1+AG at
M = M∗ and S = SR. Using the results proved in Lemma 2,
duL
duG
|−≥ − 1+AL1+AG and duLduG |+≤ − 1+AL1+AG will then also hold
at M = M∗ and S = SU .
Define X = (uL |(M∗,SR), uG |(M∗,SR)) and Y =
(uL |(M∗,SU ), uG |(M∗,SU )). Also define C1 = [1 +
AL]uG |(M∗,SR) +[1+AG]uL |(M∗,SR). Since V1 is concave,
it follows from the initial slope and end slope that all the points
(uG, uL) on V1 satisfy [1 + AL]uG + [1 + AG]uL ≤ C1.
As proved in Lemma 2, all the points that belongs to U
are on parallel lines with one end on V1 and with a slope
of −[1 + AL]/[1 + AG]. Hence, all the points in U except
the points on the straight line between X and Y satisfy
[1 + AL]uG + [1 + AG]uL ≤ C1.
Now draw a horizonal line and a vertical line from the threat
point. As shown in Fig. 10, let I denote the point where the
vertical line intersects with the straight line between X and Y ,
and let J denote the point where the horizonal line intersects
with the straight line between X and Y . By definition, the
right triangle IζJ constitutes the Case-1 barter set, which is
clearly non-empty, compact, and convex.
Case 2:
Fig. 11. Illustration of the Case 2 utility possibility set U and barter set B
for GenCo G and LSE L. The barter set reduces to the non-contract threat
point.
When following the proof below, please refer to Fig. 11.
Define C2 = [1 + AL]ζ1 + [1 + AG]ζ2. As shown in Lemma
5, when condition (101) fails to hold, duLduG |(MR,SR) ≥ −
1+AL
1+AG
.
Because V1 is concave, all the points (uG, uL) on V1 satisfy
[1 + AL]uG + [1 + AG]uL ≤ C2. As proved in Lemma 2, all
the points that belong to the utility possibility set U are on
parallel lines with one end on V1 and with a slope of −[1 +
AL]/[1 + AG]. Hence, all the points in the utility possibility
set U satisfy [1 + AL]uG + [1 + AG]uL ≤ C2.
Therefore, the threat point is the only point in the utility
possibility set U that satisfies both uG ≥ ζ1 and uL ≥ ζ2. This
can be proved by contradiction. Suppose there is another point
(u′G, u
′
L) in U apart from the threat point that satisfies both
u′G ≥ ζ1 and u′L ≥ ζ2. Then, [1+AL]u′G +[1+AG]u′L > C2.
This contradicts our previous conclusion that all points in U
satisfy [1 + AL]uG + [1 + AG]uL ≤ C2. It follows that the
Case-2 barter set reduces to the threat point. The typical shapes
of the utility possibility set U and the barter set B for Case 2
are thus as shown in figure 11.
Case 3:
Fig. 12. Illustration of the Case 3 utility possibility set U and barter set B
for GenCo G and LSE L. The barter set is a right triangle.
When following the proof below, please refer to Fig. 12.
Let N = (uG |(MU ,SR), uL |(MU ,SR)) denote the endpoint of
the curve V1. As shown in Lemma 5, when condition (101)
holds but condition (102) fails to hold, the slope of V1 at the
threat point is smaller than − 1+AL1+AG and the slope of V1 at N
is also smaller than − 1+AL1+AG .
Again, as shown in Lemma 2, all the points that belongs
to U are on parallel lines with one end on V1 and a slope of
−[1 +AL]/[1 + AG]. Since V1 is concave, the typical Case-3
shape of U is as shown in Fig. 12.
Let W = (uG |(MU ,SU ), uL |(MU ,SU )) denote the point
on curve V2 corresponding to (MU , SU ). Let C3 = [1 +
AL]uG |(MU ,SR) +[1 + AG]uL |(MU ,SR). Given the above
findings for the endpoints of V1, together with the concavity
of V1, it follows that all the points (uG, uL) on V1 satisfy
[1+AL]uG + [1+AG]uL ≤ C3. Again, as proved in Lemma
2, all the points that belong to U lie on parallel lines with one
end on V1 and with a slope of −[1 + AL]/[1 + AG]. Hence,
all the points in U satisfy [1 + AL]uG + [1 + AG]uL ≤ C3.
Now draw a horizonal line and a vertical line from the threat
point. Let the point where the vertical line intersects with the
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straight line between N and W be denoted by I , and let the
point where the horizonal line intersects with the straight line
between N and W be denoted by J . As shown in Fig. 12,
the right triangle IζJ constitutes the Case-3 barter set B by
definition. Clearly B is non-empty, compact, and convex.
QED
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